While there is a large body of literature on the determinants of allocation of intergovernmental …scal transfers in developed countries, this kind of study is still very limited for developing countries, especially Subsaharan countries. Using an original micro-level public …nance panel data from Senegal, we address three issues: (1) Does the Senegalese allocation system of …scal transfers conform to the guidance of normative theory, in particular, to the equity principle? (2) Does this allocation system eliminate politically motivated targeting of transfers? (3) If not, what kind of political factors explain the horizontal allocation of …scal resources? By rigorously estimating a panel data for 67 local governments ('communes') from 1997 to 2009, our results tend to show that equity concerns do not a¤ect the allocation of intergovernmental grants in Senegal, leading to the conclusion that the resources distribution system does not comply with the dictates of normative theory. Moreover, we …nd evidences that political considerations in ‡uence the horizontal allocation of transfers. In particular, our analysis suggests that transfers allocation follows a pattern of tactical redistribution more than patronage, swing communes being targeted while partisan communes are not.
Introduction
While …scal decentralization has been adopted by a large part of the developing world, there is a broad consensus in the literature that the bene…ts expected from decentralization will not materialize if the system of intergovernmental …scal transfers does not rely on an equitable and e¢ cient horizontal allocation mechanism. Although a huge literature on the determinants of allocation of central grants in developed countries exists, this kind of study is still limited for developing countries, especially Subsaharan countries. This paper attempts to …ll the gap in the empirical literature by raising the issue of how such transfers are allocated across local governments in a Subsaharan country, Senegal.
The traditional theoretical view on central transfers is that they should be guided by equity and e¢ ciency considerations, a welfare maximizing government wanting to reallocate resources between richer and poorer jurisdictions and to correct for externalities (Buchanan, 1950 , Oates, 1972 , Gramlich, 1977 . Actually, a number of empirical studies have pointed out that political factors are more relevant in explaining the allocation of grants. Beginning with Wright (1974) , economic historians examined the question of how transfers were allocated amongst American states during the New Deal in the 1930s and found that political variables explained this allocation considerably better than economic considerations.
As Banful (2010) notices, empirical studies have concerned an array of countries like Albania (Case, 2001) , Argentina (Porto and Sanguinetti, 2001) , Australia (Bungey, Grossman, and Kenyon, 1991, Worthington and Dollery, 1998) , Canada (Albouy, 2010) , Ghana (Banful, 2010, Miguel and Zaidi, 2003) , India (Khemani, 2007 , Cole, 2009 , Arulampalam et al., 2009 ), Israel (Alperovich, 1984) , Japan (Meyer and Naka, 1999) , Portugal (Pereira, 1996, Veiga and Pinho, 2007) , Russian Federation (Treisman, 1996) , Sweden (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002) , Tanzania (Boex, 2003) and the United States (Anderson and Tollison, 1991, Wallis, 1998 ). An international comparison of these works shows that, besides local expenditure needs and …scal capacity, other factors including electoral concerns and political in ‡uence play important roles in the horizontal allocation of grants. Central governments appear to be opportunistic, using transfers to maximize their chances of re-election or partisan, allocating grants to further interests of their political support groups (Cox, 1986 , Grossman, 1994 , Case, 2001 , Banful, 2010 .
A common view is that basing the allocation of …scal transfers on a formula limits the discretionary power of politicians in distributing central grants so that this strategy has been widely adopted in the developing world (Banful, 2010) . In this paper, we test the e¤ectiveness of formulas in eliminating discretion by analyzing how transfers are allocated across local governments in Senegal where a formula allocation mechanism is employed. More precisely, we intend to tackle the three following issues: (1) Does the Senegalese allocation formula allow a distribution of …scal transfers that conforms to the dictates of normative theory, in particular, to the equity principle? (2) Is such an allocation system actually su¢ cient to eliminate politically motivated targeting of grants? (3) If not, what kind of political factors explain the allocation of …scal resources? This paper adds to the existing empirical literature studying horizontal allocation of transfers and we believe its contribution to be twofold. First, to our knowledge, this is one of the …rst papers to exploit an original micro-level public …nance panel data from a Subsaharan country to test political economy theories of …scal transfers' allocation. It allows us to see to what extent results obtained for developed countries can be observed for a developing country. 1 Besides, Senegal is a particularly interesting case since a received wisdom says that transfers allocation is determined by political a¢ nity between the central and local governments, as it is the case in many African countries (Banful, 2010) , and some mayors deplore a discriminatory and opaque distribution of grants. 2 Second, we employ a consistent econometric method which generates credible empirical results. Indeed, we use the …xed e¤ects vector decomposition (FEVD) estimator developed by Plümper and Troeger (2007) to avoid failure to control for heterogeneity of local governments and ine¢ ciency in estimating the e¤ect of variables that have little within variance, common issues in this kind of study. Moreover, to test whether equity concerns are dominant in the allocation of transfers, we compute an innovative poverty index at local level using the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and its geographic data.
After having brie ‡y reviewed the literature on normative and political economy determi-1 The …ndings of Miguel and Zaidi (2003) concerning Ghana already suggest that in African democracies ruling parties are able to reward their supporters and use the advantages of incumbency to win subsequent elections.
2 See, for instance, Le ministre Aliou Sow brocardé par Alioune Sarr, le Pcr de Notto Diobasse, Le Peuple, October 18th 2010 (http://lepeuple-sn.com) or Fonds de dotation : Aliou Sow fait la part belle à sa collectivité selon le PCR de Ndindy, Rewmi, November 2nd 2010 (http://www.rewmi.com/). nants of …scal transfers, we rigorously investigate the empirical importance of such determinants in the distribution of central grants across local governments in Senegal by estimating a panel data for 67 communes from 1997 to 2009. (1) Estimation results tend to show that equity concerns do not impact the allocation of intergovernmental grants in Senegal, leading to the conclusion that the resources distribution system does not follow the dictates of the normative theory.
(2) We also …nd evidences of politically motivated targeting of transfers despite the formula-based system. (3) In particular, our results highlight three kinds of political motivation. First, our analysis suggests that transfers allocation follows a tactical redistribution, which consists in targeting swing communes to achieve electoral success. Second, local governments which are better represented in parliament seem to receive larger grants, con…rming one of the most consistent empirical results in this literature.
Third, ethnic fractionalization seems to be positively correlated with per capita transfers which might indicate that the central government uses …scal resources as a way to pacify potentially troubled areas.
Section 2 o¤ers a brief review of the literature on the determinants of intergovernmental transfers. Section 3 presents the institutional background of transfers in Senegal, the empirical model, strategy and …ndings. Section 4 concludes with some policy implications.
2 Normative and political economy determinants of intergovernmental …scal transfers: A literature review Three stands of the literature consider factors that may in ‡uence the distribution of central transfers across local governments (Boex and Martinez-Vazquez, 2005 First, there is a consensus in the local public …nance literature that a system of …scal transfers should be designed to achieve equity and e¢ ciency in the allocation of resources (Buchanan, 1950 , Oates, 1972 , Gramlich, 1977 . The central government is assumed to be a 'benevolent planner', which maximizes social welfare. The rationale behind the equity principle is the need for a reduction in horizontal …scal imbalances existing between local jurisdictions. Thereby, transfers should compensate the unequal access to local public goods and services generated by the uneven distribution of resources across the country. The pursuit of this objective leads to expect a pro-poor allocation of grants. However, most empirical studies …nd that wealthier local governments receive greater transfers, indicating that political considerations outweigh those of equity (see Kraemer, 1997 , Alm and Boex, 2002 , Wallis, 1998 , Meyer and Naka, 1999 . The economic e¢ ciency objective seeks to correct for externalities and compensate spillover e¤ects among jurisdictions in the provision of some local public services. This incentive objective would result in the central government providing greater grants in response to higher expenditure needs. 3 In empirical studies, local expenditure needs and costs generally have a positive impact on the level of transfers received by a local government. Exceptions include Nigeria (Alm and Boex, 2002) and
Mexico (Kraemer, 1997) where expenditure needs have no e¤ect and a negative impact on grants received, respectively. 4 Second, the literature on targeted redistribution distinguishes between patronage, which consists in rewarding political supporters, and tactical redistribution, which aims at achieving electoral success. Greater political support for the central government in a particular jurisdiction can be rewarded by greater transfers. For instance, Miguel and Zaidi (2003) …nd evidence from Ghana of core supporters'targeting, districts from where the ruling party won all the parliamentary seats. 5 This patronage can also be tactical, however. Indeed, Cox (1986) argues that the optimal strategy for risk-averse opportunistic candidates is to favor partisan jurisdictions to maintain existing political supports. Similarly, Bungey, Grossman, and Kenyon (1991) and Leyden (1992) show that party closeness between central and local politicians increases returns in term of central government's support, and therefore the level of transfers. Case (2001) interprets empirical …ndings of greater grants in Albania to juris-dictions where the President received more votes in the past election as evidence of targeting of …ef districts, considered as more 'pivotal'. If the central government can reward its supporters or target it to maintain political support, it can also favor its opponents (Treisman, 1996) or 'swing'jurisdictions, where the distance of vote shares between the largest parties is small. Electoral results in these jurisdictions are assumed to be determined by how much they receive in resource transfers from the center. Arulampalam, Dasgupta, Dhillon, and Dutta (2009) construct a model where the federal government allocates transfers to states that are aligned with the incumbent party but also swing. Using Indian panel data, they validate their theoretical model. 6 In the context of an African country, Banful (2010) also …nds evidence that per capita grants are higher in Ghanaian districts where vote margins in the previous presidential election were lower. Following the predictions of the well known model of opportunistic political budgetary cycles provided by Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988) , the central government is also expected to transfer more resources in election years to increase its likelihood of re-election. According to Worthington and Dollery (1998) , grants in local election years would be more productive due to a heightened awareness of policies but, in the case of central elections, the returns from purchasing political capital in this manner would be o¤set by direct political bene…ts of central direct expenditure so that transfers should decrease.
Third, beyond electoral considerations, political decision-making processes are likely to be captured by powerful interest groups. Assuming that local o¢ cials try to extract as much resources as possible from the center, those with higher bargaining power may receive larger grants. The fact that local jurisdictions with higher political representation bene…t from greater transfers is one of the most robust empirical …ndings (Wright, 1974 , Porto and Sanguinetti, 2001 , Khemani, 2007 . 7 Smaller jurisdictions are also expected to receive greater per capita transfers, which may be caused by scale economies or by their potentially higher lobbying power. In particular, this bias may be explained by an urge to secure 6 Cole (2009) also …nds that state governments in India supply greater subsidized agriculture loans to electoral districts where the ruling party had a narrow margin of victory (or loss) and Johansson (2003) provides theoretical and empirical evidence that swing Swedish municipalities receive larger grants than other groups. 7 For instance, Atlas (1995) shows that the allocation of per capita federal net spending in the United States from 1972 to 1990 was a¤ected by states'per capita congressional representation and highlights that the institutional basis of political representation a¤ects spending allocations across states. broad political support. 8 In the context of a developing country, central governments may also use economic means to deal with social con ‡icts. 9 A common argument in favor of decentralization is that local governments are enabled to allocate public spending in line with the preferences of heterogeneous local communities. However, Tranchant (2010) shows that, while this hypothesis may be relevant for local majorities, it is not the case for local minorities, who are not in a position of strength. In this context, …scal decentralization can increase local con ‡icts, marginalized ethnic minorities clashing against powerful local majorities. Hence, the central government may use transfers as an instrument to pacify potentially troubled areas like ethnically fractionalized jurisdictions (Treisman, 1996) . 10
The determinants of intergovernmental …scal transfers in

Senegal: Empirical evidence
In this section, we intend to determine whether the Senegalese allocation system conforms to the dictates of the normative theory and if this system eliminates politically motivated targeting of transfers. We …rst investigate the institutional background of intergovernmental transfers in Senegal, then we specify our econometric model and strategy. Lastly, we present our principal …ndings resulting from the estimation of a panel data for 67 communes from 1997 to 2009.
Intergovernmental transfers in Senegal: Institutional background
Senegal has shown a remarkable political stability since its independence in 1960, which was strengthened by peaceful presidential transitions. Abdou Diouf served …ve terms as Table   1 presents Senegalese communes' revenue sources and their evolution. Local own-revenue represents around 85% of local resources and are divided into tax and non-tax own-revenue.
The …rst one is mainly constituted by taxes on property, patent, advertisement, water, electricity and waste removal while the second one is related to the public domains'occupation (markets, car parks, tow pound...) and to some administrative services. Central transfers represent around 10% of the total local resources and have become more important in ab-1 1 Since 2007, the president is elected for a …ve-year term renewable once. 1 2 Local o¢ cials are elected for a six-year mandate but local elections, initially planned for May 2008, were reported in March 2009 due to the modi…cation of the regional administrative zoning.
1 3 There is also an administrative level between regions and communes: the departments (départements) but they are managed by a representative of the central government.
1 4 See law 96-06 with the Local Governments Code. solute terms. One of the main features of …scal decentralization in Senegal is the increasing level of revenue at local level. However, local resources remain insu¢ cient to provide local basic public services 15 and important inequalities appear between communes: the resources of the ten poorest communes represent 1 % of the resources of the …ve richest ones. There is also an important variability across jurisdictions, which stays relatively constant over time.
In 2009, communes such as Ranerou, Oussouye and Foundiougne received more than four times the national average, while other jurisdictions like Pikine or Bargny received a transfer per capita ten times smaller than that amount.
State subsidies should mitigate the lack of resources and reduce horizontal …scal imbalances. The design and implementation of transfers deserves serious concern, in particular, in developing countries (see Bird and Smart, 2002 Our empirical work will help to determine if these criteria are su¢ cient to allow an e¢ cient and equitable distribution of resources and to forbid the incentives of politicians to divert resources for personal gain.
1 5 Tax own-revenue of all communes represents on average only 6 % of the central tax revenue
The basic empirical model
To test whether the allocation of transfers is in ‡uenced by economic considerations and the presence and the nature of any politically motivated targeting of resource, we use the general empirical framework followed in the literature (Boex and Martinez-Vazquez, 2005) .
Per capita amounts of transfers received by a local government are regressed upon sets of equity/e¢ ciency and public choice variables that may impact center's …scal decision.
To determine whether the Senegalese system conforms to the dictates of the normative theory we consider …scal incapacity and expenditure needs. We …rst examine the impact of a local government's …scal incapacity on the size of the transfers it receives by using a DHS poverty index (see the following section 3.3.1). If equity concerns are at play in the allocation of transfers, we should …nd a positive coe¢ cient associated with …scal incapacity. Second, we include local expenditure needs and costs in our econometric model (e¢ ciency principle).
The variables that are generally used to measure local expenditure needs are demographic variables such as the size of the school-aged population, the economically dependent population, or urbanization (Meyer and Naka, 1999, Wallis, 1998) . 16 The population density is also commonly used to measure the per capita cost of providing local public goods. 17 We retain two variables; urbanization rate and population density. While we unambiguously expect a negative coe¢ cient associated with population density, it is not possible to know a priori which of rural or urban sets of needs dominate. 18 We then consider the in ‡uence of electoral concerns in the allocation of grants. We introduce a qualitative dummy variable that indicates if the central and local governments are of the same political party. This variable allows us to test the existence of patronage and Cox (1986) model, according to which the optimal strategy of political candidates is to favor their supporters. We also include a variable that measures the di¤erence in vote shares expressed in absolute values between the central government party and its main opponent, in the last local election in each commune (see Case, 2001 and Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002) . 19 With this variable, we test the prediction that swing communes are targeted by the incumbent party. Moreover, two dummy variables for elections, central and local, are included in order to account for time-periods when ability to purchase political capital may vary from the norm (Veiga and Pinho, 2007) . Since elections are held at the beginning of the year, we consider the year before elections. Following the prediction of Worthington and Dollery (1998), local and national election years should exhibit a positive and negative coe¢ cient, respectively.
Lastly, we introduce the number of deputies represented by departments, a local government with larger political representation per capita being expected to extract larger per capita transfer. We also consider the relative population size of the commune to test the existence of a bias in favor of smaller jurisdictions. In the particular context of a developing country, central decisions may also concern ethnic fractionalization, transfers being a potential instrument to avoid local con ‡icts. 20
Finally, we de…ne the following empirical model:
Indicators used for each category are summarized in Table 2 .
Econometric framework
Before introducing our econometric strategy, we present our composite measure of local …scal incapacity, based on a DHS poverty index.
An indicator of local incapacity
Following studies that rely on composite measures of local incapacity, we propose to estimate a poverty index using the 1997 and 2005 DHS with their geographic data. 21 Due to the abundance of household survey data on asset ownership and the considerable biases measurement 1 9 Two main concepts are used in the literature. Swing voters are de…ned as those with weak party preferences, while swing jurisdictions are those where the distance of vote shares between the central government party and its main opponent is minimal. We focus on the second one.
2 0 We also consider ethnic polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005 error associated with reported income or consumption, a substantial body of literature has developed an asset-based measure of wealth. Filmer and Pritchett (2001) concluded that the DHS wealth index actually performed better than the traditional consumption or expenditure index in explaining di¤erences in economic status. Hence, in the footsteps of Filmer and Pritchett (1999) and Sahn and Stifel (2003) , we compute a composite poverty indicator from the DHS surveys. 22 However, since the DHS wealth index has been criticized as being too urban in its construction, we propose, as suggested by Rutstein (2008) , to produce a single national-level composite index from wealth indexes that have been separately constructed for the urban and rural areas. 
Econometric issues and strategy
Our econometric model is quite similar to those considered in the literature and su¤ers from several defects. We then present our econometric strategy.
2 2 The general methodology used to calculate the wealth index is given in Filmer and Pritchett (2001) . The speci…c approach used in the DHS is described in Rutstein and Johnson (2004) .
2 3 It is a technique for extracting from a set of variables those few orthogonal linear combinations of the variables that capture the common information most successfully (for a detailed explanation, see Filmer and Pritchett, 2001) .
2 4 Based on descriptive statistics, we thought that possession of most livestock would be exclusively rural and some other items such as computer or internet access would be exclusively urban. The construction of the national index uses the set of indicator variables that the rural and urban areas have in common and is restricted to those that correlate with wealth in the same direction 2 5 The level and distribution adjustment values are found by regressing the value of each household's area-speci…c index scores onto its national index score. For instance, with the DHS 2005, we have: 
where W In; W Iu; and W Ir are the national, urban-speci…c, and rural-speci…c wealth index scores, respectively. We also use a quadratic form of the regressions since it improves the …t a little.
Econometric issues First, we correct for all time-invariant community characteristics, observed or unobserved, and all 'year e¤ects'. 26 Local governments di¤er in ways that are captured only imperfectly by our economic and political variables and these persistent differences may produce signi…cant di¤erences in transfers. So, we include a commune-speci…c e¤ect, i . Then, omitted variables that vary over time but are constant between communes can in ‡uence the amount of transfers available and received and, at the same time, the …scal capacities of communes. By introducing time dummies (T t ) we correct this potential endogeneity bias due to omitted variables. We should limit the arti…cial positive correlation between the …scal capacity and transfers, both increasing because of their common correlation with a third variable, for instance, the national economic conjuncture. 27 Second, we consider endogeneity bias due to reverse causality. This turns out to be important for a number of variables, especially for …scal incapacity. Indeed, local spending, in part …nanced by central transfers, may reduce local poverty. Hence, if jurisdictions with higher transfers tend to have higher …scal capacity, then, estimates will show that jurisdictions with higher …scal capacity receive larger transfers. However, in our case, the …scal incapacity index represents a more permanent status than does either income or consumption so that transfers at time t probably cannot a¤ect the level of wealth at time t. If doubts remain, we propose to use the lagged value of …scal incapacity indicator to test the robustness of our estimations. Concerning political variables, if we believe that politicians use public resources to buy support, we must also believe that transfers have an e¤ect on electoral results. However, since we use values of electoral outcomes that are determined before the start of a …scal year, transfers are unable to a¤ect past results so that the coe¢ cient of political a¢ liation variable should not be biased. We could also consider the possibility of a 'vote with feet', where people are encouraged to migrate when they perceive situations to be better in another jurisdiction, such as a higher level of transfers. However, we think that this potential bias is limited since Tiebout's model rests on assumptions of perfect mobility and information, which are seldom found in developing countries (Bardhan, 2002) . Finally, since we regress central transfers on explanatory variables of which some are observed on a more aggregate level, we introduce department cluster (Moulton, 1990) .
Econometric strategy A panel data approach allows us to control for the potentially large number of unmeasured explanatory variables by estimating a '…xed-e¤ects'(FE) model.
However, the FE model does not allow the estimation of time-invariant variables and results from its ine¢ ciency in estimating the e¤ect of variables that have little within variance (Baltagi, 2001 , Wooldridge, 2002 , Hsiao, 2003 . 28 In order to assess coe¢ cients of timeconstant or rarely changing variables, and to control for commune speci…c e¤ects, we propose to use the FEVD estimator developed by Plümper and Troeger (2007) . 29 This estimator, based on a three-step procedure, allows a decomposition of the unit …xed e¤ect ( i ) into two parts; a part explained by the time-invariant variables and an unexplained part, b h i . 30
Regression (1) becomes:
Based on Monte Carlo simulations, Plümper and Troeger (2007) …nd that the vector decomposition model performs far better than pooled OLS, Random-E¤ect (RE), and the Hausman-Taylor procedure. 31
To capture the potential persistency in central transfers, we also consider the dynamic version of our model by introducing the lagged dependent variable. This yields the inconsistency of …xed-e¤ect estimators (see Nickell, 1981 ) so that we use the GMM-System estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) .
2 8 In our case, for instance, ethnic variables, which are time-invariant variables, are dropped in the …xed e¤ect model so that it is impossible to determinate whether these variables a¤ect the allocation of …scal transfers.
2 9 Rarely changing variables are de…ned as having a low within variance. Our variables of political and ethnic factors, …scal capacity, urbanization rate and population are rarely changing variables with a little within variance.
3 0 A formal explanation of this estimator is given in Plümper and Troeger (2007) . 3 1 An alternative answer to assess coe¢ cients of time-constant variables and to control for commune-speci…c e¤ects is to use a RE model. However, this estimator implies orthogonality between explanatory variables and the error term, a hypothesis that does not seems to be relevant in our case. The Hausman test actually con…rms that we should use FE estimators. Table 5 gives estimation results. First, we test the static model with the FEVD estimator.
Data and estimation results
To test the robustness of our estimations, we introduce progressively a trend (2) and a department cluster (3), we use alternative indicators (4), 33 the lagged value of the …scal incapacity indicator (5) and year dummies instead of the trend variable (6). Then, we estimate the dynamic model with one-step robust GMM-System estimator (7). 34 Does the central government assist jurisdictions with poor tax bases and greater socioeconomic needs as it should according to normative guidance? Equity concerns seem not to be at play in determining the allocation of …scal transfers. Indeed, we …nd a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient associated with our indicator of …scal incapacity indicating that poorer local governments receive smaller intergovernmental transfers. This result is consistent with most empirical studies (Kraemer, 1997 , Alm and Boex, 2002 , Wallis, 1998 , Meyer and Naka, 1999 . Estimation results support the hypothesis that expenditure needs have an e¤ect on transfer allocation. Indeed, the urbanization rate is negatively correlated with …scal transfers suggesting that transfers alleviate special rural problems. However, population density, used to measure the per capita cost of providing local public goods, seems to be positively correlated with …scal transfers, probably capturing urban needs since a higher degree of urbanization is generally associated with higher population density.
Is the allocation of …scal transfers also guided by political logic despite the formula-based system? Our results actually suggest that normative guidance is not the only motivation that determines the distribution of grants across communes. First, as regards electoral concerns, while supporter communes do not appear to receive more transfers, greater resources seem to be provided to local governments that are more swing. Indeed, coe¢ cient associated with our proxy for swing communes is always negative and signi…cant at 1% level. Contrary to the …ndings of Case (2001) and Miguel and Zaidi (2003) , the center does not seem to target more resources to its supporters. Transfers are not targeted to areas in which political support is concentrated to maximize return in terms of votes, as predicted by Cox (1986) .
Our result is closer to Cole (2009) , who …nds that politicians, who care about winning election, target swing jurisdictions. It also reinforces the …ndings of Banful (2010) suggesting that swing districts can be targeted in an African context. We cannot clearly con…rm the predictions of Worthington and Dollery (1998) . Indeed, the year before national election is negatively but not always signi…cantly correlated with grants and coe¢ cient associated with the year before local elections is positive but rarely signi…cant. Second, other political and ethnic considerations play important roles in the distribution of per capita transfers across communes. This last point is con…rmed by the positive association between transfers and political economy determinants such as representatives in parliament, population and ethnic fractionalization. Indeed, greater representation per voter seems actually to result in greater per capita transfers, which is consistent with empirical …ndings in the literature (Wright, 1974 , Porto and Sanguinetti, 2001 , Khemani, 2007 . Population is generally negatively and signi…cantly correlated with …scal transfers, probably denoting a disproportionate lobbying power of smaller communes. Beyond the e¤ect of political considerations, ethnic fractionalization is positively correlated with per capita …scal transfers. It indicates that the central government may use transfers as a paci…cation instrument as Treisman (1996) suggested.
Our results are robust to the introduction of a trend variable, a cluster department and year dummies. Moreover, the impact of …scal incapacity remains negative when we correct for potential simultaneity bias and our conclusions do not change when we use alternative indicators of political a¢ liation and ethnic fractionalization. Finally, our …ndings are similar when we consider the dynamic model even if the lagged dependant variable appears to be not signi…cant, which is not surprising in a context of developing country where central transfers are instable.
Conclusion
This paper exploits an original public …nance panel data allowing us to test political economy theories of …scal transfers for a developing country, Senegal. The estimation of a panel data for 67 communes from 1997 to 2009 suggests that the allocation system in Senegal does not conform to the dictates of normative theory. In particular, equity concerns do not appear to a¤ect the allocation of intergovernmental …scal transfers. On the contrary, wealthier local governments seem to receive greater intergovernmental transfers. Moreover, our results tend to show that the allocation of transfers follows a tactical redistribution by targeting swing communes and to con…rm that local governments with more political power receive larger transfers. The Senegalese case also emphasizes the importance of ethnic considerations and the fact that the central government may use transfers as a tactical instrument to pacify fractionalized areas. Our …ndings are consistent with those observed in other countries. Indeed, intergovernmental transfers are generally allocated in a needs-equalizing way but are counterequalizing when it comes to …scal capacity, and political economy factors are consistently a driving force in determining the distribution of intergovernmental …scal transfers.
Our work adds to empirical evidence from around the world that has shown several instances in which politicians in central government make …scal decisions by optimizing their electoral objectives and being in ‡uenced by political factors beyond economic considerations.
It shows that results found for developed countries can actually be observed for a developing country. This study also highlights that an allocation system based on a formula can be insu¢ cient to eliminate politically motivated allocation of transfers. Eliminating discretion seems to require more than a formula. Delegating responsibility for the distribution of resources across local governments to an independent agency could help to mitigate such distortions (Khemani, 2007) . 18,732 14,662 36,736 21,189 26,000 27,885 35,419 37,982 43,601 47,443 44,629,219 49,422,824 Local non-tax own-revenue 
Electoral concerns
Patronage P A it , a dummy variable which takes the value one if commune i has the same political a¢ liation as the president in o¢ ce.
We consider alternately P S it , the score of the president in o¢ ce at the previous local election.
Tactical distribution
DV it measures the di¤erence in vote shares expressed in absolute values between the central government party and its main opponent, in the last local election in each commune.
Opportunistic cycles
EN t 1 and EL t 1 are dummy variables, which take the value one the year before of national and local election, respectively.
Other political factors
Political representation N it , the number of representatives in parliament by department d on year t.
Population size
P it , the population size of the jurisdiction i on year t.
Ethnical factors
EF it , the ethnic fractionalization in communes i on year t de…ned as the probability that two individuals randomly drawn from a jurisdiction are from di¤erent ethnic group. We also consider alternative indicator by using ethnic polarization, EP it . 
